We investigate the effect of public (PUVC) and private (PRVC) venture capital funds on the sales growth of 6,513 European New Technology-Based Firms (NTBFs) in the period 1992-2009. Our results show that PUVC-backed NTBFs underperform with respect to PRVC-backed ones, and do not grow more than non-VC-backed companies. The impact of PUVC is still not statistically significant (even though positive) when PUVC funds target young NTBFs. The only notable exception is when PUVC funds co-finance with PRVC funds and both target young firms.
Introduction
The core of recent policy initiatives promoted at the European level is to revitalize the dynamic efficiency of the old continent to generate breakthrough technologies and radical innovations, and translate them into new products, processes and services. Measures like those included in the European Framework Programme for Research and Innovation (Horizon 2020) and the European Programme for the Competitiveness of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (COSME) have the ultimate aim to reverse the course of the European economy and turn a generalized low economic growth performance into a sustainable high growth path.
In this respect, high-tech entrepreneurial firms (often referred to as New Technology-Based Firms, NTBFs) 1 represent a fundamental policy target, given their contribution to the social welfare (Audretsch, 1995; Stam and Garnsey, 2008) . However, the number of NTBFs in the European context is lower than the one registered in other geographical contexts, e.g. the United
States (The Economist, 2012) .
Two of the most advocated reasons for such gap are the bank-based nature of most (continental) European economies (Hernandez-Canovas and Martinez-Solano, 2010 ) and the thinness of the European venture capital (VC) markets (Bertoni and Croce, 2011) . As a matter of fact, debt capital is not the most suited financing mode for NTBFs (Berger and Udell, 1998) . The lack of a long and solid track record and the technology-intensive nature of their business model typically engender high information asymmetries towards lenders (Carpenter and Petersen, 2002) . Moreover, most of the assets owned by NTBFs are firm-specific and/or intangible (e.g., founders' human capital) and hence cannot be pledged as collateral. Conversely, the extant economics and finance literature identified privately-managed venture capital (PRVC, 1 This study adheres to the gold standard definition of a 'new technology-based firm' originally due to Arthur D. Little (1977) that identifies a NTBF as an independent firm less than 25 years old and active in high technology industries.
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Page 4 of 42 4 t h E u r o p e a n C o n f e r e n c e o n C o r p o r a t e R & D a n d I n n o v a t i o n henceforth) funds as the most appropriate source of external financing for NTBFs (Bygrave and Timmons, 1992; Gompers and Lerner, 2001) . PRVC funds (PRVCs, henceforth) are reputed to be able to pick NTBFs with high growth potential and provide them with the proper financial resources to realize it (Amit et al., 1998) . PRVCs also provide their portfolio companies with coaching (Sahlman, 1990; Hellmann and Puri, 2002; Colombo and Grilli, 2010) , effective monitoring (Gompers, 1995; Lerner, 1995; Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003, 2004) and valuable business contacts (Hsu, 2006; Hochberg et al., 2007; Lindsey, 2008) .
By acknowledging the European VC market thinness and helping overcome the typical chicken-egg paradox of nascent markets (i.e., the shortage of VC supply is caused by lack of entrepreneurial opportunities and vice versa), policymaking institutions have in the recent past pursued a "hands-on" approach, i.e. the setting-up of several government-managed VC (PUVC, henceforth) funds. This direct involvement of governmental and public institutions in the European VC industry is now numerically relevant (especially if compared to the US market) and, from a policy perspective, should complement the (thin) presence of PRVCs (Bottazzi and Da Rin, 2002) . 2 However, the effects and consequences of this specific typology of direct public involvement in the VC industry are largely under-researched and consequently unknown. In particular, it is ignored if and to what extent PUVC funds (PUVCs, henceforth) engender any beneficial effect at portfolio company level. In the extant literature, very few studies have explicitly focused on the role of PUVC in the European context (for an exception, see Grilli and Murtinu, 2013) . Most of the evidence comes from analyses conducted outside Europe, the US and Canada among others (e.g., Cumming and MacIntosh, 2006) . Moreover, only few studies consider the portfolio company as the unit of analysis (see Section 2.2). While, the issue has been prevalently investigated through a macroeconomic lens or with a focus on the overall returns of the funds 4 t h E u r o p e a n C o n f e r e n c e o n C o r p o r a t e R & D a n d I n n o v a t i o n (Leleux and Surlemont, 2003; Armour and Cumming, 2006; Da Rin et al., 2006; del-Palacio et al., 2012) .
In this work, we contribute to fill this gap by enlarging and complementing the analysis performed in Grilli and Murtinu (2013) . In particular, other than inquiring into the ability of PUVCs -in absolute terms and relatively to PRVCs -to help NTBFs penetrate markets and sustain steadily their sales growth, we also investigate if the impact of PUVCs is conditional on the timing of investment, i.e. whether the portfolio NTBF received the PUVC investment at the very beginning of its life or not.
In the empirical part of the paper, we estimate an augmented Gibrat law-type panel data Estimations are based on 6,513 firms for which we have data on the variables of interest, observed from 1992 (or year of firm's foundation) to 2009 (or year of firm's exit from the dataset). In order to control for the potentially endogenous nature of VC financing, other than Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and panel random effects (RE) approaches, we resort to the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM)-system (SYS) estimator.
Due to the novelty and richness of the database at our disposal, the paper adds to the entrepreneurial finance literature in several crucial aspects. First, we provide evidence on the effects of VC investments on the sales growth of European NTBFs at an unparallel level with respect to extant studies in the field, that generally have a national focus or analyze limited samples (in size, time-span or scope). Second, most previous studies suffer from methodological weaknesses which are overcome in our work, such as the focus on IPO firms only (Bottazzi and Da Rin, 2002) , and the lack of control for survivorship bias and endogeneity (see Bertoni et al., 4 t h E u r o p e a n C o n f e r e n c e o n C o r p o r a t e R & D a n d I n n o v a t i o n 2011 for a review). Third, we are the first to investigate to what extent the policy "hands-on" approach -as it has been pursued in the European VC market -is able to sustain NTBFs' market penetration. In doing so, we contribute to the ongoing debate on policies towards innovative entrepreneurship (e.g. Schneider and Veugelers, 2010; Czarnitzki and Delanote 2013) .
Furthermore, by comparing PUVCs and PRVCs, we also add to the growing scientific interest on investor heterogeneity and how this translates into different performances for portfolio companies (Manigart and Wright, 2013) .
Our results are consistent across the methods and indicate that overall the impact of PUVCs is negligible, while the effect associated to PRVCs is positive, statistically significant and economically relevant. Furthermore, PRVC backing is more beneficial if it occurs in the early stages of a portfolio company's life. More interestingly, the impact of PUVCs is still not statistically significant (even though positive) when PUVCs target very young NTBFs. The only notable exception for recovering a positive role for the public actor is when PUVCs co-finance with PRVCs and both target young NTBFs. In this latter case, PUVC support turns out to be statistically significant and economically relevant.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next Section we provide a clear definition of PUVC, survey the literature on the effects of PUVCs and PRVCs on firm growth, highlight the specific characteristics of different types of VC investors, and finally formulate our research hypotheses.
In Section 3 we describe the VICO dataset that will be used in the empirical analysis and provide descriptive statistics. Section 4 illustrates the empirical methodology. Section 5 reports the results and several checks performed to test the robustness of our findings. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
Literature background and research hypotheses

Definition of PUVC
4
t h E u r o p e a n C o n f e r e n c e o n C o r p o r a t e R & D a n d I n n o v a t i o n
The VC literature lacks an unified definition of what is PUVC. Examples of definitions used in the fields of economics and entrepreneurial finance are: i) programs that make equity or equity-like investments in young firms, or encourage other intermediaries to make such investments (Lerner, 2002) ; ii) programs that subsidize high-tech industries through direct VC funds and tax policy (Cumming, 2007) ; iii) hybrid public/private funds (Jääskeläinen et al. 2007 ). This heterogeneity is well highlighted in the work of Leleux and Surlemont (2003, p.82) :
"Legislatures and governments play a number of roles in energizing private equity markets. First, they define both the legal and fiscal environments in which investors operate, providing various degrees of protection and/or taxation to different constituencies, flows (capital gains, dividends, etc.) and structures (partnerships, sole proprietorships, etc.).
[…] Second, they sometimes intervene directly in the venture capital process by funding and managing public venture funds […] . Third, they provide incentives or impediments to private equity investments by regulated private companies such as banks, pension funds or insurance companies".
This study deals with the second type of public intervention cited by Leleux and Surlemont (2003) . In this respect, there are two modes of direct government intervention in the VC market: i) the support to the fundraising of PRVCs; and ii) the setting-up of government-managed VC funds. The first mode is represented by the entry of the government as limited partner in VC funds managed by independent VC firms, non-financial corporations or banks. 3 The second mode is what we define as a policy "hands-on" approach in the VC market. In this case there is the setting-up of VC funds owned by government bodies or public administrations, in which the public operator acts as general partner, being responsible for investment choices and actively managing the fund. We focus on this second type of intervention.
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4 t h E u r o p e a n C o n f e r e n c e o n C o r p o r a t e R & D a n d I n n o v a t i o n Balboa et al., 2007 for Spain) . This is also confirmed by Grilli and Murtinu (2013) . In their analysis based on the VICO dataset, by adopting several econometric techniques, it is shown that PUVC-backed NTBFs would have followed similar growth patterns even without the initial public investment.
Policy rationale for PUVC
Most of the literature on the public support to NTBFs and, more generally, to firms' R&D activities adheres to an "ideal" vision of the role of policymakers. In this view, the public policy mission aims at sustaining those projects that bring benefits to the social welfare but which are presently dominated in private value by other projects which are targeted by private investors (Link and Scott, 2010) . Therefore, the objective pursued by policymakers should be to select projects with high social benefits that are below the private hurdle rate and would remain 4 t h E u r o p e a n C o n f e r e n c e o n C o r p o r a t e R & D a n d I n n o v a t i o n unexpressed without the public intervention. Bad quality business projects are unlikely to fall in this category. Moreover, it is very unlikely that a direct participation in a long-stagnant NTBF might be regarded as a successful policy intervention.
In the perspective of a social welfare-enhancing intervention of policymakers, the realistic possibility that civil servants select promising business projects neglected by private operators is made clear by Lerner (2002) and Shane (2009) . 5 If this is not "implausible", as Lerner (2002) indeed suggests, there could be several arguments to be invoked for sustaining an opposite thesis (and the same article of Lerner furnishes a list; see also Gilson, 2003) . In a nutshell, asymmetric information problems might be amplified for policymakers, who might select the wrong projects.
Additionally, policymakers may engage in "cherry picking" behavior (Lerner, 1999), i.e. they could invest in firms that would have grown even without their intervention, so to avoid any possible critique of wasting public money. Or conversely, they could not refrain from "technology pork barrel" spending (Cohen & Noll, 1991) , i.e. they could allocate investments on the basis of distributive logics across communities of interest rather than on the basis of social welfare considerations.
Private versus public VC
The financial literature highlights several motives to explain why the access to PRVC financing should enhance NTBFs' ability to gain market acceptance through an increase in sales growth. First, PRVCs generally focus on specific industries (Gompers, 1995; Amit et al., 1998) .
Due to their industry specialization, they allegedly develop context-specific screening capabilities that make them able to properly judge the commercial value of entrepreneurial 4 t h E u r o p e a n C o n f e r e n c e o n C o r p o r a t e R & D a n d I n n o v a t i o n projects and the entrepreneurial talent of the proponents (Sahlman, 1990) . Second, PRVCs are active partners (Gorman and Sahlman, 1989; MacMillan et al., 1989; Barry et al., 1990) . On the one hand, they tightly monitor portfolio companies (Gompers, 1995; Lerner, 1995) . On the other hand, PRVCs make use of specific financial instruments and contractual clauses (e.g., stage financing) which protect their investments from opportunistic behaviors on the part of entrepreneurs (Bienz and Hirsch, 2012; Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003, 2004) . This corporate governance approach creates high powered incentives for entrepreneurs to pursue revenues growth (Sahlman, 1990; Hellmann, 1998; Casamatta, 2003; Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003, 2004) . 6 Third, PRVCs perform a key coaching function to the benefit of portfolio companies (Sapienza, 1992; Sapienza et al., 1996; Colombo and Grilli, 2010) . In fact, PRVCs provide advising services to portfolio companies in fields in which these firms typically lack internal competencies (Barney et al., 1996) , such as strategic planning, marketing, finance and accounting, and human resource management. Hellmann and Puri (2002) Page 11 of 42 4 t h E u r o p e a n C o n f e r e n c e o n C o r p o r a t e R & D a n d I n n o v a t i o n high-tech companies (Lerner, 2002) ; ii) offer those expertise and advice that specialized PRVCs provide to their portfolio companies (Leleux and Surlemont, 2003) . Second, the incentives structure PUVC managers face may differ markedly from the traditional VC fund arrangement, where managers typically benefit from a performance-related bonus (Leleux and Surlemont, 2003) . So talented managers are likely to be more attracted by PRVCs rather than PUVCs.
Further, PUVC managers may not be even greatly stimulated in improving their skills, given their "fixed" pay structure. Third, PUVCs are less able to tightly monitor their portfolio companies than PRVCs (Secrieru and Vigneault, 2004) . In fact, PUVCs use less sophisticated corporate governance mechanisms as well as less voting rights than PRVCs (Hirsch and Walz, 2013) . Accordingly, our first hypothesis descends:
H1. The impact of PUVCs on NTBFs' sales growth is lower than the one exerted by PRVCs.
PUVC and young NTBFs
The impact of PUVC investments on the sales growth of NTBFs might depend on the age in which the focal NTBF receives the first PUVC round. At the very beginning of their life, NTBFs are based on risky projects and are often founded by technically talented individuals with only few managerial and commercial competencies (Colombo and Grilli, 2005) . In other words, young NTBFs typically lack some tangible and intangible resources which are vital to gain market acceptance. Hence, NTBFs need to establish formal and informal links with individuals and organizations (in particular other firms) to access physical (e.g., distribution channels, financial resources) or intangible (e.g., external knowledge) complementary assets (Teece, 1986, Gans and Stern 2003) . However, NTBFs face enormous difficulties in accessing such external resources in the first years after foundation, because of their lack of a track record. In fact, this lack of reputation engenders high information asymmetries towards (uninformed) third parties.
Hence, NTBFs need to signal their competences and capabilities. Patenting (Hsu and Ziedonis, 2013) , endorsement by a reputable alliance partner (Stuart et al., 1999; Stuart, 2000) or by a VC Page 12 of 42 included in the dataset were less than 20 years old in 2010, were independent at foundation (i.e.
not controlled by other business organizations), and operate in high-tech industries (see Table 1 for the list of included sectors). The dataset includes two strata of companies: VC-backed companies and non VC-backed (but potentially investable) companies. All VC-backed companies received their first round of VC funding between 1994 and 2004 and were less than 10 years old at that time.
The identification of VC-backed companies started with a random extraction from a variety of proprietary and commercial sources. Country-specific proprietary sources were the yearbooks of the Belgium Venture Capital and Finnish Venture Capital Associations, the ZEW Foundation Panel (Germany), the RITA directory and Private Equity Monitor (Italy), the José Martí Pellón Database (Spain), and the Library House (now Venture Source, the UK). Commercial databases were the Thomson One database, VCPro-Database, and Zephyr. The collected information was also cross-checked with publicly available sources: the websites and annual reports of VC investors, press releases and press clippings, and initial public offering (IPO) prospectuses. The use of several sources of information allows the dataset to embrace a set of VC investors which is usually largely underrepresented by more customary commercial data sources (e.g., PUVCs, corporate and bank-controlled VC funds), especially in Europe (Ivanov and Xie, 2010: p. 135 ).
This data collection process allowed us to ensure that the VICO dataset is representative of the 7 The VICO dataset does not include information on buyout investments, real estate, mezzanine investments, distressed debt funds, private investments in public entities (PIPEs), issuance of credit, angel investments and private equity investments.
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t h E u r o p e a n C o n f e r e n c e o n C o r p o r a t e R & D a n d I n n o v a t i o n European population of VC-backed companies (for more details, see a recent report of the European Parliament, 2012). Moreover, the dataset includes both successful and non-successful deals and both surviving and non-surviving (e.g., bankrupt, acquired) companies.
The second stratum of the dataset is composed of non VC-backed NTBFs. It derives from a random extraction (conditional on the criteria reported before on firms' age, independence and industry affiliation) from different calendar year versions of Bureau Van Dijk's Amadeus dataset. All available vintage years of Amadeus were used to ensure the inclusion of both surviving and non-surviving companies, in order to avoid the emergence of a survivorship bias (see the robustness check in Section 5.2.2). As for VC-backed companies, commercial databases (Zephyr) and country-specific proprietary sources (e.g., Creditreform in Germany, Italian business community's data bank in Italy) were also used to improve the coverage of the dataset.
For each NTBF in the dataset an in-depth information set was collected, including: general company information (name, year of foundation, NACE industrial classification, and NUTS2 geographic area), contact information (address, phone, fax, name and email address of a manager or a founder), accounting information, status (active, liquidated, acquired, inactive), and listing (if the company went through an IPO and, if so, when). Information on VC investors regards their typology and the date on which their investments occurred. Information collected at local level was checked for reliability and internal consistency by each national team and regularly sent to the central data collection unit, which ensured that information was consistent and comparable across countries. In particular, data were cross-checked with those available from public sources, e.g. reports provided by the national associations of private equity investors and financial reports of VC investors.
8
The VICO dataset allows us to overcome many of the weaknesses which plagued most 8 More detailed documentation on the procedures and sources used in the data gathering process and on all of the portfolio company-, investment-, and investor-level variables included in the VICO dataset, is provided by Bertoni and Martì (2011) .
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t h E u r o p e a n C o n f e r e n c e o n C o r p o r a t e R & D a n d I n n o v a t i o n previous empirical studies. 9 First, some of these studies focus on IPO firms only, the reason being that information about these firms is easier to collect. However, focusing on samples composed of IPO firms only may create biases with respect to the outcome of the investment, the type of investor, the type of company, and the industries which are represented in the sample.
Moreover, the analysis of firm performance in the period following the IPO does not allow to disentangle the effect of VC financing from that of the IPO. Second, many studies include only a population of firms which survived as independent firms up to a certain date. This might give rise to survivorship bias due to lack of control on the dynamics related to bankruptcies and mergers and acquisitions.
Descriptive statistics
The breakdown by country and industry of PRVC-backed, PUVC-backed, and the subset of co-financed companies is provided in Table 1 (co-financed NTBFs enter in each category; for the sake of completeness we also report data on non VC-backed companies). 10 Our definition of co-financing closely adheres to the second definition of syndication provided by Tian (2012: pp. 249-250) . Given that our analysis is not at round-level, we implicitly assume that PRVCs and PUVCs co-invest when they invest in the same portfolio company (see Brander et al., 2002 for the same criterion).
[ Table 1 Table 2 illustrates the distribution of NTBFs backed by different types of VC investors according to the age of the portfolio company at the time of the first round of VC financing: 162 out of 216 PUVC-backed companies (75%) were invested when they were three years old or less. It is worth noting that the same pattern applies to PRVC financing (75.13%) and to cofinancing (74.80%).
11
[ Table 2 about here]
In Table 3 , we report some descriptive statistics about size (in terms of sales value) and age for VC-backed and non-VC-backed companies. PRVC-backed companies are bigger than the other firms: on average, PRVC-backed companies reach a size of about € 6 million, while sales 11 In the industrial organization literature, there is not a commonly accepted threshold to define young firms. Some studies use 5 years old (e.g., Lotti et al., 2003) , others 3 years old (e.g., Cabral and Mata, 2003) . In first instance, we adopt this latter more stringent requirement. However note that, as explained in the Section 5.2.2, we re-estimated 4 t h E u r o p e a n C o n f e r e n c e o n C o r p o r a t e R & D a n d I n n o v a t i o n value is € 3 million for PUVC-backed and co-financed companies and € 4 million for non VCbacked companies. Age distributions are similar across all VC categories (around 6 years old), while non VC-backed companies are slightly older (around 7 years old).
[ Table 3 about here]
Econometric methodology
Specification of the econometric models
The impact of PRVC and PUVC investments on firm growth is first investigated through the estimation of an augmented Gibrat law-type panel data model (Model I) a là Chesher (1979):
This specification is a sort of gold standard in the industrial organization literature on firm growth dynamics (Sutton, 1997; Caves, 1998 These results are fully in line with our main results (see Table 8 ).
12 Given that LnSales i,t and LnSales i,t-1 are expressed in logarithms, their difference is a proxy for sales growth:
SalesGrowth i,t = LnSales i,t -LnSales i,t-1 . Our equation (I) can be re-written as: SalesGrowth i,t = ߙ0 + ߛLnSales i,t-1 +
߰1PRVCi,t-1 + ߮1PUVCi,t-1 + Wi + ߝi,t, where ߛ is equal to (ߙ 1 -1), with ߛ representing the impact of the lagged value of sales on sales growth. 13 To take into account the presence of firms with sales value equal to zero, we add a unity to the argument of LnSales i,t . Note also that the series Sales i,t has been deflated by the Consumer Price Index (source: Eurostat; reference year: 2005).
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t h E u r o p e a n C o n f e r e n c e o n C o r p o r a t e R & D a n d I n n o v a t i o n first initial step to reduce potential reverse causality concerns (see Section 4.2). If PRVC (PUVC) investments positively affect firm growth, we obtain ψ 1 >0 (φ 1 >0 In this specification, Young i,t is a dummy variable that equals unity for NTBFs that are three years old or less. Therefore, whereas ψ 1 and φ 1 reflect the effects of PRVC and PUVC investments on the sales growth of relatively more mature NTBFs, the effects of PRVC and PUVC investments for relatively younger NTBFs are captured by ψ 1 +ψ 2 and φ 1 +φ 2 , respectively. This way, the sign and significance of φ 2 provides the test for hypothesis H2.
Finally, note that in both model specifications we also add a set of control variables, including country dummies, industry dummies and year dummies, which allow us to control for crosssectional differences between countries and industries and across time, respectively. Estimations 
Estimation methodology
We estimate our two models by means of the GMM-SYS estimator (Blundell and Bond, 1998) . 15 In fact, the possible endogenous nature of the relationship between VC and firm growth and the inclusion in our models of the lagged dependent variable among covariates requires the use of appropriate instrumental variables techniques. A positive association between VC and firm growth might simply be the result of reverse causality and unobserved heterogeneity. This problem is likely to be especially significant for NTBFs, because their (growth) performance is closely related to unobservable characteristics such as innovative business ideas, the development of a unique technology, or a team of smart entrepreneurs . If these unobservable characteristics also influence the ability of NTBFs to attract VC, a spurious correlation between VC and growth follows because of unobserved heterogeneity. 16 Hence, we adopt a GMM-SYS estimator with the finite-sample correction for the two-step covariance matrix suggested by Windmeijer (2005) . In the GMM-SYS procedure, in addition to using the lagged levels of the series as instruments for first differenced equations (as in the GMMdifference procedure), additional moment conditions are employed using first differences as instruments for variables in levels.
Some important remarks are in order concerning the use of a GMM estimator (see also Colombo et al., 2013) . First, the use of long series as instruments can result in significant finite sample bias (Roodman 2009 ). Moreover, measurement errors can cause potential distortions. To deal with both these problems (Bond 2002; Roodman 2009 ), we estimate our models through 15 We also add OLS and panel RE estimators for comparison purposes. All results are presented in Section 5. We do not resort to fixed effects (FE) estimation because classical Hausman tests speak in favor of the appropriateness of the RE estimator.
t h E u r o p e a n C o n f e r e n c e o n C o r p o r a t e R & D a n d I n n o v a t i o n two different GMM-SYS estimators that use a reduced instrument set: i) with moment conditions in the interval between t-3 (t-2) and t-4 (t-3) for instruments in levels (differences); and ii) with lags from t-3 (t-2) to t-5 (t-4) for instruments in levels (differences). 17 Postponing VC instruments to the third lag is also useful for ensuring that the estimates are robust to measurement errors (see Bond, 2002) . 18 The validity of the instruments was gauged by Hansen tests (results are reported in the Tables). We also performed pseudo-first stage regressions to test the reliability of our instruments. Results (see Appendix and Table A1 ) corroborate the robustness of the employed GMM-SYS estimators, and strongly support the choice of employing a GMM-SYS approach rather than simply a GMM-difference estimator.
Empirical findings
Results of the estimates
Results from the OLS (column I), RE (column II) and GMM-SYS estimates of Model I are shown in Table 4 . As regards GMM-SYS estimates, results obtained with moment conditions in the interval between t-3 (t-2) and t-4 (t-3) for instruments in levels (differences), and in the interval between t-3 (t-2) and t-5 (t-4) for instruments in levels (differences) are in columns III and IV, respectively. All GMM-SYS regressions pass the Hansen tests, reassuring us about the 17 A third GMM estimator that uses lags from t-3 (t-2) to t-6 (t-5) for instruments in levels (differences) produces very similar results to those exposed here and it is omitted for the sake of synthesis. 
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t h E u r o p e a n C o n f e r e n c e o n C o r p o r a t e R & D a n d I n n o v a t i o n validity of the instruments employed. OLS and panel RE estimates are shown for comparison purposes only. In the explanation of our findings, we give place to the GMM-SYS results.
The estimation of Model I reveals that PRVCs are found to exert a positive and always statistically significant impact on the sales growth rate of European NTBFs. In fact, sales value in PRVC-backed companies increases substantially after the PRVC investment event. Such increase in yearly sales growth is also economically significant: in GMM-SYS estimates, it ranges between +31.49% and +32.69%. 19 Conversely to PRVCs, the public operator is found to exert a negligible impact on firm sales growth. Looking at the magnitude of the coefficients, the one for the PRVC variable is always larger than that of the PUVC one, and their difference is always statistically significant at conventional confidence levels (at 5% in GMM-SYS estimates). To sum up, our first research hypothesis H1 is supported.
[ Table 4 about here]
Results from the estimation of Model II are shown in Table 5 . As to the GMM-SYS estimates, also in this case, the Hansen tests reassure us about the validity of the moment conditions, i.e. the absence of correlation between the instruments and the error terms. Results suggest that PRVC financing has a positive and statistically significant (always at 1%) effect on the sales growth of (relatively more) mature NTBFs: in GMM-SYS estimates, the increase in yearly sales growth ranges between +27.99% and +28.74%. More interestingly, the average treatment effect is greater if the NTBF receives PRVC for the first time when it is three years old or less. In terms of economic magnitude, the estimated increase in yearly sales growth in young PRVC-backed companies (given by the sum of the coefficients ψ 1 and ψ 2 ) is statistically significant at 1% and ranges from +43.36% to +44.52%. With regard to PUVC, the average treatment effect on (relatively more) mature NTBFs is negligible. The short-run impact of PUVCs becomes positive 4 t h E u r o p e a n C o n f e r e n c e o n C o r p o r a t e R & D a n d I n n o v a t i o n on the sales growth of young NTBFs, even though is never statistically significant (i.e. the test on φ 1 +φ 2 = 0 is not rejected at conventional confidence levels in both GMM-SYS estimates).
Looking at the difference between the average treatment effect of PUVC on the sales growth of young and mature NTBFs, the coefficient φ 2 is positive but it turns out to be always statistically insignificant in GMM-SYS estimates. Therefore, our research hypothesis H2 does not find confirmation.
[ Table 5 about here]
Finally, as regards the dynamic nature of Model I and Model II, the coefficient of lagged size is always positive and significantly different from unity. This is consistent with the stylized fact highlighted by the empirical literature on the Gibrat law (Sutton, 1997; Caves, 1998 ) that smaller firms tend to grow faster than larger ones.
Additional evidence and robustness checks
We ran several different checks in order to deep our understanding and test the robustness of our findings.
Co-financing
We have ignored the possibility that co-financing activities between different types of VC investors might exert a distinctive treatment effect on firm growth upon the mere summation of the effects due to each single type of investor. To explore the issue, we re-run our two models E u r o p e a n C o n f e r e n c e o n C o r p o r a t e R & D a n d I n n o v a t i o n GMM-SYS estimates both for Model I (columns I and II) and II (columns III and IV) are presented in Table 6 . Also in this case, the Hansen tests reassure us about the validity of the moment conditions employed in all GMM-SYS estimates. With regard to Model I, the effect of co-financing between PRVCs and PUVCs on firm sales growth is blurred. In fact, co-financing seems to positively impact on the sales growth of NTBFs, even though this effect is statistically significant (at 10%) only in column I. The estimated increase in yearly sales growth is +33.00%.
The results on PRVC and PUVC are very similar to those shown in Table 4 . PRVCs continue to exert a positive and statistically significant impact on the sales growth of their portfolio NTBFs.
The statistical significance is at 1% (5%) in column I (II). The estimated increase in yearly sales growth after turning into a PRVC-backed NTBF ranges between +32.90% and +35.50%. Again, the PUVC investor is found to exert a negligible impact on the sales growth of European NTBFs.
Our research hypothesis H1 is still supported.
[ Table 6 about here]
With regard to Model II, the effect of co-financing between PRVCs and PUVCs on the growth of (relatively more) mature NTBFs is positive but not statistically significant. More interestingly, our results suggest that the estimated short-run increase in yearly sales growth in young co-financed companies (i.e. the sum of the coefficients of COFIN i,t-1 and COFIN i,t-1 *Young i,t ) ranges from +62.90% to +63.54% and such effect is statistically significant at 5% level (even though the single coefficients of COFIN i,t-1 and COFIN i,t-1 *Young i,t are not statistically significant by their own). These results echo Lerner (2002) in suggesting that public programs can be successful only if public VC bodies act as partners rather than competitors of PRVCs. Investments of PRVCs and PUVCs on young and mature NTBFs exert average treatment effects similar in magnitude and statistical significance to those exposed in Table 5 .
Again if we look at the difference between the average treatment effects exerted by the PUVC investor on young and mature NTBFs, the coefficient φ 2 is positive, but it is only weakly 4 t h E u r o p e a n C o n f e r e n c e o n C o r p o r a t e R & D a n d I n n o v a t i o n significant (at 10% level) in Column IV and largely insignificant in the estimates of Column III.
Thus, results confirm the weak positive moderating role exerted by the timing of investment in shaping the (negligible) impact of PUVCs on NTBFs' sales growth.
To have a glimpse on the long-run economic magnitude of the different average treatment effects of VC investments on the sales growth of young NTBFs, it is helpful to make a simple calculation and compare the evolution of sales dynamics of a typical young NTBF subjected to 3 different treatments: i) PRVC backing, ii) PUVC backing, and iii) co-financing. 21 More precisely, we calculated the evolution over time of the sales level of a German software NTBF born in 1994 that received in the year 1995 the treatments i), ii), or iii) when it had a level of sales equal to € 1.5 million (mean value among the non VC-backed companies at the end of the year of foundation). Then, we calculated the corresponding figure for the same NTBF without VC backing. According to the GMM-SYS estimates presented in Table 6 (Column IV), after eight years (in 2002), the PRVC-backed NTBF would have reached a level of sales of € 2.746 million (+128.83% respect to 1994) and the co-financed NTBF a level of sales of € 2.454 million (+104.57%). As highlighted above, both these effects are statistically significant, whereas the PUVC-backed NTBF would have reached a level of sales very similar to the one achieved by the non-VC backed twin (€ 2.153 million versus € 2.102 million, respectively).
Test for a survivorship bias and sensitivity analyses
We tested if our results might be driven by the presence of survivorship bias. As long as low growth performers are more likely to exit from the market and VC-backing is (positively or negatively) associated to this eventuality, our results could be (downwardly or upwardly) biased.
The VICO dataset enables us to test the potential influence of survivorship bias through the recent test proposed by Semykina and Wooldridge (2010) . This variable-addition test is based on 21 The long-run effect of a VC investment on young NTBFs cannot be computed using a simple non-linear combination of parameters from Model II, since the dummy variable Young i,t (by definition) switches back to 0 at the age of four years and makes vanish the parameters associated with the corresponding variables.
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t h E u r o p e a n C o n f e r e n c e o n C o r p o r a t e R & D a n d I n n o v a t i o n the estimation of the same models' specification presented in Table 4 and Table 5 , augmented by the inclusion of a time-varying inverse Mills ratio (IMR) term. IMR is computed from the coefficients of the independent variables (i.e., size, VC backing, industry dummies and country dummies) of a series of probit models that are run each year on the NTBFs' probability to exit the sample because of failure or loss of independence (e.g., acquisition). In our data, the null hypothesis of the absence of a significant survivorship bias is accepted in all models at conventional confidence levels (estimated results are shown in Table 7 ).
[ Table 7 about here]
Finally, we performed other two important robustness checks. We re-estimated our models shown in Table 4 and Table 5 by: i) excluding biotech companies -due to their peculiar characteristics in terms of sales growth patterns compared to NTBFs operating in other industries, with the potential absence of any sales for many years since firm's inception; and ii) performing a sensitivity analysis on the dummy Young i,t (see footnote n.11). As regards this latter check, results hold if we reduce (at two years old) or increase (up to five years old) the youth threshold: findings are fully in line with our baseline model (i.e., three years old or less). All results are exposed in Table 8 (for the sake of synthesis only GMM (3,4) estimates are presented).
[ Table 8 about here]
Concluding remarks
As explained since the Small Business Act for Europe in 1998, NTBFs play a key role for the future development of Europe. However, the funding gap suffered from NTBFs represents a serious threat to the social welfare in With regard to future research we suggest two important directions. First, the negligible impact of PUVCs might be driven by the strong heterogeneity of PUVC interventions in Europe.
From an empirical point of view, the results of PUVC interventions deployed in different countries might be confounded by the diversity of the underlying management structures and country-level institutional characteristics. Therefore, future research should aim at filling this gap by identifying the main features of PUVC programs in Europe, in terms of: i) sources of financing (e.g., percentage of public money on total fundraising); ii) internal organization; iii) objectives (financial, industrial, strategic, social); iv) selection of portfolio companies (industries, size); v) investment style (financial instruments used, lengths of the investment and investment exit, voting rights); and vi) complementary assets and value added provided to portfolio companies (competences, network, subsidies).
The second direction for future research we hint is related to public-private partnerships. In the extant literature the main motives to justify syndicated deals (whose public-private partnerships represent a subset) are: i) risk diversification; ii) improved screening through a 'second opinion' in the due diligence process (Casamatta and Haritchabalet, 2003) ; iii)
t h E u r o p e a n C o n f e r e n c e o n C o r p o r a t e R & D a n d I n n o v a t i o n certification and reputation gains when syndicating with more experienced venture capitalists (Barry et al., 1990) . There are no studies that exploit the abovementioned three dimensions in explaining the potentially different impact of 'fully private' syndicated deals and 'public-private' syndicated ones on the growth of portfolio companies. I n n o v a t i o n Legend. In columns I, III, V and VII, the mean value of the focal variable related to PRVC-backed companies, PUVCbacked companies, co-financed companies and non VC-backed companies, respectively. In columns II, IV, VI and VIII, the standard deviation of the focal variable related to PRVC-backed companies, PUVC-backed companies, cofinanced companies and non VC-backed companies, respectively. Mean and standard deviation values calculated on all companies included in a category in all years of operation, both before and after the potential receipt of VC funding. (Deflated) sales values are expressed in k€. Estimates are derived from OLS regressions with standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity through the HuberWhite method and serial correlation within firms (column I), RE regressions with robust standard errors (column II), GMM-SYS with moment conditions of endogenous variables restricted to the interval t-3 (t-2) and t-4 (t-3) for instruments in levels (differences) with finite-sample correction for the two-step covariance matrix developed by Windmeijer (2005) (column III), and GMM-SYS with moment conditions of endogenous variables restricted to the interval t-3 (t-2) and t-5 (t-4) for instruments in levels (differences) with finite-sample correction for the two-step covariance matrix developed by Windmeijer (2005) (column IV). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Degrees of freedom in square brackets. * p-value < 0.1; ** p-value < 0.05; *** p-value < 0.01.
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